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A plan to deploy Nato ships in the Aegean sea to tackle people smugglers operating between
Turkey and Greece was agreed in early February. Angelos Chryssogelos writes that the new
mission will do little to inﬂuence the dynamics of the migration crisis, with eﬀective management of
the problem still reliant on Turkish cooperation. He also argues that by signing up to the Turkish
demand to make Nato the main arena for deliberations over the crisis, Europe’s interests are now in
danger of being entangled with Turkey’s agenda in Syria.
The recent Nato agreement to create a mission to tackle the migration crisis in the Aegean has
been presented as a major new development. But its impact on migrant ﬂows will in reality be limited. Its shape and
scope for action is a reﬂection of Turkey’s priorities in the region rather than European needs. The creation of the
Nato mission showcases the EU’s strategic irrelevance and highlights Turkey’s desire to entangle Europeans in its
adventurist endeavours in Syria.
Nato’s mission in the Aegean
The Nato mission will conduct monitoring, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Aegean in order to deter and
contain the activities of human traﬃckers. Nato forces will not push back boats, except when rescuing migrants from
drowning who will be returned to Turkey. The task of deterring smugglers will be performed by the Greek and Turkish
coastguards. But assistance from Nato will not make much of a diﬀerence if the key actor in the crisis, Turkey, does
not act decisively. The stemming of migration ﬂows still hinges on Turkish will to patrol its coasts.
In previous months, Turkey had been under pressure
to patrol its coasts more eﬀectively. But it refrained
from acting because the cost of accepting back or
keeping in Turkish territory large numbers of migrants
was considered much higher than whatever rewards
the EU had promised. Caving in to external pressure
would also be infuriating for domestic public opinion.
A Nato mission allows Turkey to give in to some EU
demands while circumventing these problems. As the
mission covers Turkish as well as Greek territory,
Turkey can deﬂect part of the European pressure for
control of migrant ﬂows back on its neighbour. Turkey
has also ensured that its actions will be scrutinised by
an organisation in which it has a strong say.
Turkey’s complex Syria strategy
The migration issue forms only one aspect of a
complex geopolitical game that Turkey is involved in
now in Syria. Turkey’s relationship with Russia has deteriorated rapidly. Moscow’s clients in Syria have made
signiﬁcant inroads against Turkey’s allies, threatening it with both a collapse of its support and the arrival of new
waves of refugees to its borders. Turkey’s position is further complicated by the assertiveness of Syria’s Kurds,
whom Turkey’s Western allies consider a valuable ally against Islamic State.
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Turkey is now pushing for stronger support from Nato for its activities in Syria. A ﬁrst step was taken in the same
meeting that authorised the migrant mission in the Aegean. There, Nato also decided to step up its participation in
the ﬁght against Islamic State, initially by deploying AWACS planes in the region. Involving Nato in the management
of the migration crisis is part of a broader strategy by Turkey to align Europeans with its goals in the region. Any
signs of Turkey becoming more cooperative on migration in the following weeks must be seen through the prism of
its interests in Syria and its expectation that Europe will support it there in return.
Europe’s strategic irrelevance
The EU hopes that Turkey will do more on migration if it is subject to international monitoring. But because it was
negotiated with Turkey, the mission’s mandate does not do enough to push Turkey into action. In addition, the
mission’s scope reﬂects strategic considerations on the part of Turkey that do not square with the goal of limiting
migration. For example, Turkey insisted that the Nato mission would not operate in the southern Aegean. Turkey
disputes the sea border between its southern coast and the Dodecanese islands in Greece, hence it wants to avoid
this border being implicitly recognised in the operational plan of a Nato mission. As a result, migration ﬂows will
simply be diverted from islands in the central and northern Aegean to the south.
Even more crucially, by accepting Nato involvement the EU agrees to deal with Turkey in a setting where Turkey will
be better placed to trade oﬀ its contribution in the migration crisis for support for its actions in Syria. Europeans have
long realised that the migration crisis can only be eﬀectively dealt with at its source, which is Syria, and that they
cannot simply shield themselves from the outside world. But due to its extreme vulnerability, internal divisions and
strategic limitations, the EU may ﬁnd itself being involved in Syria on Turkey’s terms.
These developments highlight the EU’s chronic strategic irrelevance, even in the eyes of its members. It is telling
how quickly European countries rallied around Nato. The idea of the EU deploying its own forces on the other hand
was barely raised. The lack of operational capacities is not an excuse since the Nato mission will be made up
overwhelmingly of forces from countries that are also EU member states. The EU has decided since last November
to run a similar mission against human smugglers in Libya after all, and it is striking that such a solution was never
considered for the Aegean.
Ultimately, Nato’s mission in the Aegean will do little to inﬂuence the dynamics of the migration crisis as the EU
hopes. Eﬀective management of the problem still relies on eﬀective Turkish cooperation, and this will be contingent
on Turkey’s wider strategic considerations. By signing up to the Turkish demand to make Nato the main arena for
their deliberations, Europe’s interests are in danger of being entangled with Turkey’s agenda in Syria. Finally, in
seeking recourse to Nato for what is essentially a question of defending Europe’s borders, the EU has once again
proven its weakness as a strategic actor.
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